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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
-RELEVANCY OF REQUIRED TESTIMONY
Defendant was summoned before the House Un-American Activities
Committee, which was authorized to investigate (1) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities; (2) the dif-
fusion within the United States of subversive and un-American
propaganda instigated from foreign countries or of domestic origin;
and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress
in any necessary remedial legislation.' Defendant refused to disclose
to the Committee the names of communists in a certain union between
1942 and 1947, a period prior to the enactment of existing legislation.
The district court found him guilty of contempt2 and defendant ap-
pealed. Held, reversed. The information sought was not pertinent to
a determination of the need for remedial legislation but was obviously
requested in order to expose communists, a matter outside the scope
of the Committee's investigatory power. Watkins v. United States, 233
F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
It is generally conceded that legislative bodies have an inherent
power to conduct investigations in the aid of prospective legislation and
for the purpose of securing information necessary to the discharge
of their functions and powers. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either house of Congress with power
to conduct investigations, this power is deemed so far incidental to
the legislative functions as to be implied. 3 The power is not limited
to matters which may be the subject of legislation, but extends to all
matters germane to the proper and intelligent exercise of any consti-
tutional power of Congress or of either house.4 However, neither house
of Congress is invested with power to inquire into private affairs and
compel disclosures except as necessary to make its express powers
1. 60 STAT. 828 (1946).
2. '%very person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority
of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon
any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee es-
tablished by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
or any committee of either House of Congress, wilfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine of not more than $1000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common
jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." 11 STAT. 155
(1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 (1946).
3. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Seymour v. United States,
77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1935).
4. Seymour v. United States, 77 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1935).
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effective.5 Unless the inquiry is for a disclosed and legitimate purpose
and based upon specified grounds, it is unlawful and cannot be made
lawful by what it may or does bring to light.6
The basic limitation on the congressional power of investigation-
pertinency-is designed to safeguard the individual's privacy and to
protect him from needless annoyance.7 Both the contempt statute8
and the common law9 require that questions be pertinent to the de-
clared purpose of an inquiry. Pertinency is a question of law properly
decided by the court, 0 the Government having the burden of proof,"
and in so deciding the court must look to the enabling resolution and
determine the scope of the committee's duty as there defined.'M
Bowers v. United States, 3 decided by a court of appeals in 1953, ap-
parently was the first case in which it was held that pertinency was
not proved, but the principle involved was by no means a new con-
cept.14 A Senate resolution had established the much publicized "Ke-
fauver Committee" to investigate organized crime in interstate com-
merce. The court held that the Government failed to prove the perti-
nency of questions which related to the business of a witness in 1927,
to the source of monies spent by him, to his interest in a certain
restaurant in Florida, and to his knowledge of a certain person who
was reputedly a Florida gambler. In 1952 a district court in consider-
ing the same resolution and the same special Committee had ruled
that questions were pertinent which related to the business of a
witness in 1945 and to the indentity of persons with whom he was
acquainted. 15
5. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). If an investigation by a com-
mittee of the House of Representatives was judicial in its character and one
which could only be properly made by a court of justice and by a judicial
proceeding, it is by the Constitution a judicial and not a legislative power.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
6. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
7. Note, 32 B.U.L. REv. 326, 335 (1952).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
10. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); United States v. Di Carlo,
102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012
(D.D.C. 1951).
11. See United States ex rel. Cunningham v. Mathues, 33 F.2d 261 (3d Cir.
1929), dismissed as abated, 282 U.S. 802 (1930); United States v. Di Carlo,
102 F. Supp 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
12. See note 11 supra.
13. 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
14. In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), the Court laid down
the rule that the United States must "plead and show that the question per-
tained to some matter under investigation" but the decision provided no cri-
terion for the application of the rule, for ultimately the Court found the
"question asked" to be pertinent and affirmed defendant's conviction. In
United States v. Browder, No. 1784-50, D.D.C., March 14, 1951, a witness
objected to certain questions on the ground that they were not pertinent, but
defendant's motion for acquittal was granted on the theory that he was en-
titled to know the Committee's ruling on his objection, the court not deciding
whether the questions were pertinent.
15. United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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In the instant case the duty of the Committee was to investigate
communist infiltration of labor unions in order to determine the
need for legislation depriving communist-infiltrated unions of the
benefit of the National Labor Relations Act. The questions which
defendant refused to answer concerned the presence of communists
in a certain union between 1942 and 1947. The court noted that the
adequacy of present legislation enacted in 1947 would seem to depend
on what had happened prior to its enactment. The Committee, howeve,
claimed an unlimited authority to question the witness concerning
his knowledge of former communists. The instant decision seems to be
an attempt to abrogate the tendency of investigating committees to
assume the role of grand juries, and to protect the interests of every
individual in his own privacy and freedom from interference.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE-SALES TAXATION OF INCOME FROM
TRANS-SHIPMENT OF GOODS WITHIN STATE
A gas transmission company constructing a pipeline in Mississippi
had the necessary pipe shipped from out of state to railheads and de-
pots within the state, where the company's agent accepted the pipe
and inspected it to determine damage in transit. Plaintiff, a motor
freight carrier, then took charge of the pipe, gave the railroad a
receipt from the gas company, and transported the pipe to the
gas company's right-of-way, all of plaintiff's actions taking place in
Mississippi. The state tax commission demanded a sales tax of two
percent on plaintiff's income, which consisted entirely of freight
charges for handling the gas company's pipe. Plaintiff paid the tax
under protest and instituted a suit for refund in which the circuit court
allowed recovery. Held, reversed. The interstate commerce ended
when the pipe was delivered by the railroad in Mississippi and, there-
fore, plaintiff's transportation was a local activity subject to local taxa-
tion. On rehearing a suggestion of error was overruled on the ground
that even if the motor transportation was in fact interstate, never-
theless plaintiff was subject to the tax as a recompense for its use
of the state highways. Stone v. Dunn Brothers, 80 So. 2d 802 (Miss.
1955), suggestion of error overruled, 81 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1955), appeal
dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 350 U.S. 878 (1955),
petition for rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the states cannot
impose taxes for the privilege of engaging in business which is ex-
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clusively interstate in character.' In an interstate movement of goods,
a transfer from one carrier to another or a stoppage in transit with
a subsequent movement to the ultimate destination brings into focus
the question of where the interstate commerce terminated for state
tax purposes.2 It is settled that once a transportation acquires the
character of interstate commerce, it remains so until the shipment
reaches the ultimate destination intended by the parties.3 In de-
termining the character of a movement the courts have looked be-
yond the immediate situation and considered several factors. These
include the general course of dealing in similar transactions, the
plurality of carriers, the contractual relations, the form of billing, the
title and custody of the goods, and the continuity of transit.4 In-
dividually, however, these incidents are not decisive but are merely
evidence of the manifest intention of the parties as to the ultimate
destination.5 With respect to a break in an interstate transit, the
courts have looked to the purpose of the stoppage and have said that
if the break is caused by the exigencies or conveniences of the means
of transportation or by natural events over which the taxpayer has
no control, the continuity of the transit remains unimpaired as does
1. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954);
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Memphis
Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
2. For a general discussion of the extent to which the commerce clause
insulates interstate commerce from local and state taxation, see HARTMEAN,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953); Tarnay, Methods for
Differentiating Interstate Transportation from Intrastate Transportation, 6
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 553 (1938); Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce-"Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 496 (1951).
3. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465, 470 (1931) ("The mere
fact that the title or the custody of the gas passes while it is en route from
State to State is not determinative of the question where interstate commerce
ends."); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
4. Puaet Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm'n. 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Minne-
sota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S.
465 (1931); Hughes Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926);
Chqmnlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922); Baltimore &
O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166 (1922).
5. In Tennessee Natural Gas Lines, Inc. v. Atkins, 287 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn.
1956), a nipe line company operating entirely within the taxing state was
engaged in buying natural gas from an interstate pipe line company, re-
sellin a portions to a large industrial user and the remainder to a wholly owned
subsidiary which distributed gas to consumers. The corporation was held
subject to a gross receipts tax for the privilege of engaging in intrastate
commerce. The sale to the industrial user was a taxable, local activity: in-
tersfate commerce had ended. This holding is in line with the rationale of
Southern Natural Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937), where the
tax was allowed for the local activity of selling gas that came from out of
state, although taxpayer also sold gas to distributors. The sale to the distribu-
tors presumably would not have been taxable. See also Memphis Natural
Gas Co. v. Beeler. 315 U.S. 649 (1942); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283




the immunity from local taxation.6 Only where the interruption is
for the business convenience or profit of the owner does it destroy the
immunity from local taxation.7
In its initial determination that plaintiff's transportation was in-
trastate, the court in the instant case emphasized the bill of lading
from the gas company as out-of-state consignor to itself as consignee
in the state. But it is well settled that a bill of lading is not con-
clusive of the final destination.8 It seems clear from all the facts
shown that the shipper intended the pipeline right-of-way to be the
ultimate destination, which would render plaintiff's transportation to
that point a tax-free interstate activity. The court also relied heavily
on Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone9 in finding that interstate
commerce ended before plaintiff's transportation began. In that case
the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four decision, sustained a state tax
on gross proceeds received at the beginning of an interstate journey
even though the taxpayer's business was entirely interstate. It is
significant, however, that four justices upheld the tax even on the
assumption that it was a direct tax upon the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce; one justice upheld the tax on the ground
that it was imposed on a local activity; and the dissenting members
of the court maintained that the activity was interstate commerce and
immune from state taxation. A later holding in Spector Motor Serv-
ice, Inc. v. O'Connor'o made it plain that the Court will not now per-
mit a state to levy a tax upon the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. In view of this decision, it would seem that the Interstate
Oil case is no longer reliable authority.
On rehearing the court appears to be on firmer ground in finding
that the tax was imposed for the use of state highways. It is well
settled that motor carriers using state highways in interstate com-
merce are subject to exactions from the state as compensation for
the state's expense in regulating and maintaining its highways, so long
as the tax is non-discriminatory, fair and reasonable." Once it is
6. See Powell, Taxation of Things in Transit, 7 VA. L. REv. 167, 245, 429,
497 (1920-21); Annot., 171 A.L.R. 283 (1947).
7. Minnesota v. Blasias, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
The problem becomes more difficult when the stoppage may be for both
reasons, as demonstrated in Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903), where a
flock of sheep grazed from Utah across Wyoming to a point in Nebraska. As
it was said, did the sheep go to graze or graze to go? See Powell, supra
note 6.
8. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917). See also Minne-
sota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95
(1929); Hughes Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926);
Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166 (1922); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Fuentes, 236 U.S. 157 (1915).
9. 337 U.S. 662 (1949).
10. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
11. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Commissioners, 332 U.S. 495 (1947);
Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Commissioners, 306 U.S. 72 (1939); Hendrick v.
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demonstrated that the charge is for highway use, the objecting tax-
payer has the burden of showing that the amount is unreasonable -for
that purpose.'2 It does not appear that the taxpayer in the. instant
case had an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the tax, since
this facet of the case apparently was injected for the first time in the
court's opinion after rehearing.
CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE-CO-FELON -
KILLED BY VICTIM OF CRIME
As two holdup men were fleeing after armed robbery of a store, the
storekeeper apprehended and killed one of them in a gun battle. The
other was later captured and brought to trial for murder under the
felony-murder doctrine. The defendant's demurrer to the evidence
was sustained and the state appealed. Held (4-3), reversed. When the
victim of a felony kills one of the felons the co-felon may be guilty
of murder. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).
Criminal statutes very often do not define "murder,"' merely adopt-
ing the common-law definition which distinguishes murder from other
homicide by the element of malice aforethought.2 Under the common-
law felony-murder doctrine, one who causes the death of another
while in the commission of a felony which is dangerous to human life
may be guilty of murder although there was no actual intent, to kill
or to inflict serious bodily harm.3 The basis upon which the doctrine-
originated is not entirely clear; at one time the courts indulged in a
fiction, saying that the commission of the felony implied that the
felon was determined to kill rather than forego the crime.4 This con-
cept has been abandoned, however, and the implication of malice is
now generally thought to arise from the commission of a felony the
foreseeable result of which is danger to human life.5 "Malice afore-
thought" does not mean malice in its ordinary sense; the words are
Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). See Annots., 17 A.L.R.2d 421 (1951)" 92 L.
Ed. 109 (1947).
12. Capitol Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Ingels
v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937); Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S, 183
(1931) (dictum).
1. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws c. 265, § 51 (1932); PA. STAT. tit. 18, §,4701 (Purdon
1936).
2. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 198; CLARP AND MAR_ nSHALL, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CRIMEs 313 (5th ed. 1952).- 
3. See 1 WHARTON, CRnmAL LAW 685 (12th ed. 1932).-
4. For an. excellent treatment of the evolution of 'fimplied -malice," see
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought 43 YALE-L. m J. 53-7,--546 -
(1934). See-also MORELAND, HoAnMiDE 13-16 (1952). L J... ,
5. Marcus v. United States, 86 F.2d 854, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1936), Perkins, supra
note 4, at 558.
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legal words of art which have a technical meaning described by Per-
kins as "a man-endangering state of mind."6
The other prerequisite to a conviction of murder is the establishment
of a causal connection between the acts of the defendant and the death.
Because of the causation element there is an irreconcilable split of
authority as to whether a felon can be guilty of murder when a homi-
cide is accidentally committed by a person attempting to prevent the
felony or apprehend the felon. The courts have taken three positions:
(1) a killing done by a person other than the felon or his accomplices
cannot be imputed to the felon; 7 (2) if the victim of the crime is
killed after being forced from a place of safety to a dangerous place,
for example, as a shield or hostage, the felon may be guilty of mur-
der;8 (3) if any person is killed as a foreseeable result of the com-
mission of the felony, the felon may be guilty of murder.0 In all three
situations malice aforethought clearly exists. The distinction seems
to be that the necessary causal connection has been established at
different degrees of proximity. In any case, of course, the killing must
be within the res gestae of the original felony in order to constitute
murder under the felony-murder doctrine.10
Although there is a paucity of opinions from other jurisdictions on
similar fact situations, the court in the instant case had substantial
precedent upon which to base its decision. In Commonwealth v. Bol-
ish1 it was indicated that when one of two arsonists is accidentally
burned to death the other may be convicted of murder. In another
case the defendant was convicted for accidentally killing his accom-
6. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw ARTICLES 407-08 (1926). See also Nestlerode v.
United States, 122 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (act done regardless of social duty
with wilfull disregard of the rights or safety of others); State v. Wetter, 11
Idaho 433, 83 Pac. 341, 346 (1905) ("[M]alice is not confined to ill will which
one individual holds toward another, but it is intended to denote any action
flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive."); Warren v. State, 44 Tenn. 130,
136 (1867).
7. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Butler v. People, 18
N.E. 338 (Ill. 1888); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085
(1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863); State v. Majors, 237
S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922). See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl.
97-(1936); Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144 Atl. 534 (1928) (assum-
ing the point without deciding it).
8. Taylor v. State, 63 S.W. 330 (Tex. 1901); Keaton v. State, 57 S.W. 1125
(Tex. Crim. Ct. 1900). Both cases arose out of the same train robbery in
which it was disputed whether the fireman was forced into the line of fire
or entered it voluntarily.
9. Marcus v. United States, 86 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Johnson v. State,
142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1905); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68
A.2d 595 (1949); Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 299 S.W. 1049, 1051 (1927)
(manslaughter). See also Perkins. supra note 4, at 558. But see Common-
wealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905).
10. See State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W.2d 632 (1936).
11. 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464, 475 (1955) (dictum). Contra, Peonle v. Ferlin,




plice in robbery 2 and in Commonwealth v. Moyer 13 a robber was
found guilty of the murder of a policeman although it was never
established who fired the fatal shot, the court holding that this was
immaterial so long as the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause
of the death. The majority of the court in the instant case felt bound
by the decision in Commonwealth v. Almeida14 which upheld the- con-
viction of two robbers for the death of a policeman killed by a fellow
officer attempting to prevent their escape. These cases seem to equate
the necessary causal connection to proximate cause.15 This, of necessity,
reintroduces the element of foreseeability and it is not made clear
whether the foreseeability necessary to proximate cause is the same as
that required to establish malice aforethought. It would seem that a
greater degree of foreseeability would be required to establish proxi-
mate cause of a particular death than merely to establish that the de-
fendant had a man-endangeriig state of mind.
The dissenting justices in the instant case argued that because the
homicide was justifiable no murder was committed, and that the fel-
ony-murder doctrine is applicable only when the killing was done by
the felon or one acting in furtherance of the felonious undertaking.
16
The latter point has sound historical basis17 and probably no other
jurisdiction would depart from it as far as did the instant case. But
in view of the fact that the decision is simply a declaration of public
policy in relation to the prevention and punishment of crime, based
upon the precedents in Pennsylvania, the instant decision should not be
criticized unless it be on the ground that the entire felony-murder doc-
trine is of questionable value as a legal concept.' 8
EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS-TESTIMONY
AS TO OBJECTIVE FACTS
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant
when it collided with an automobile driven by one Johnson. He sued
both defendant and Johnson to recover- for his resulting injuries.
During the trial plaintiff testified that defendant was driving at a
reasonable speed on his side of the road and that Johnson, coming from
12. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
13. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
14. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
15. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949); Common-
wealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
16. 117 A.2d at 215, 224 (dissent).
17. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905); Common-
wealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922); Commonwealth v. Major,
198 Pa. 290. 47 Atl. 741. 743 (1901); 40 C.J.S., Homicide § 21 (b) (1944).
18. See MoRELAND, HoMrciDE 42-54 (1952).
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the opposite direction, swerved into defendant's lane. Defendant's mo-
tion for a directed.verdict was denied and the jury returned a verdict
against him, exonerating Johnson. Judgment was rendered accord-
ingly and defendant appealed. Held, reversed. Plaintiff's testimony, as
to facts within his observation, established that the sole cause of the
accident was the negligence of Johnson and that defendant was not
negligent; such testimony constitutes a judicial admission that plaintiff
has no rightful claim against defendant and precludes recovery from
him. Bell v. Harmon, 284 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1955).
A judicial admission is defined as an express act of waiver by a
formal statement in the pleadings or stipulations which concedes for
the purpose of trial the truth of some alleged fact. It is conclusive
upon the party making it and has the effect of withdrawing the fact
from controversy.1 This orthodox definition has been extended by most
courts to include testimony of a party during a trial which would be
fatal to his cause of action or defense. 2 There is a conflict of authority,
tiowever, with respect to the kind of testimony which may constitute
an admission.3 The difficult problem arises when other evidence is
introduced which tends to negative the party's adverse testimony and
to establish facts more favorable to his cause.4 As a general rule a
party'will be held bound by his testimony as to facts within his peculiar
knowlege,5 but not by testimony as to estimates, opinions or events
about which he could be mistaken.6 Recognizing that where observed
- 1. -9 WidmaRE, EVmENCE § 2588 (3d ed. 1940).
2. See, e.g., Kansas Transp. Co. v. Browning, 219 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1955);
Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Long v. Brown, 64 Idaho
39, 128 P.2d 754 (1942); Burton v. Ostertag, 166 Kan. 374, 201 P.2d 676 (1949);
Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (1941); Rappe v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 322 Mass. 438, 77 N.E.2d 641 (1948); Mollman v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 192 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. App. 1946); Harlow v. Laclair, 82
N.H. 506, 136 Atl. 128 (1927); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D. 10, 256 N.W. 152 (1934);
Tebbs v. Peterson, 247 P.2d 897 (Utah 1952); Stark v. Hubbard, 187 Va. 820, 48
S.E.2d 216 (1948); Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922). But
many of the cases which intimate that a plaintiff is conclusively bound by
his own testimony are not authority for the proposition because no contrary
testimony was introduced. See, e.g., Fulgham v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
158 N.C. 555, 74 S.E. 584 (1912); Zamora v. Thompson, 250 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952); Frazier v. Stout, 165 Va. 68, 181 S.E. 377 (1935).
. Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798 (1947). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2594a
(3d ed. 1940); Note, Evidence-Party's Testimony as Judicial Admission, 5
WESTERN RES. L. REV. 398 (1954); 36 MIcH. L. REV. 688 (1938); 22 VA. L. REV.
365 (1936).
4. If at the end of the- trial a party's unequivocal testimony stands uncontra-
,dicted, he is bound by it regardless of its credibility. See cases collected in
Annot., 169 A.L.R. 798 (1947).
5. "She was not simply giving her impressions of an event as a participant
.or observer'but she was testifying to facts peculiarly within her knowledge,
"i.e., realization of the fact that appellee was drunk at the time of the accident
... " Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021, 1025 (1941).
6. Harlow v. Laclair, 82 N.H. 506, 136 Atl. 128 (1927), quoted extensively
in 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2594a (3d ed. 1940), is the leading case setting forth
the distinction of fa6ts within one's peculiar knowledge. But see Alamo v. Del
fRosario, 98 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1938), in which it was said that even
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facts or opinion are being related, even the calmest and most disin-
terested witness sees things that did not happen and remembers
things that he did not see, most courts will not hold such testimony
of a party conclusive. He will be allowed to refute or explain his
position as mistaken7 or to rely on the benefit of more favorable
testimony.8
Those facts deemed to be within the peculiar knowlege of a party
have been limited by some courts to subjective facts, such as those
bearing upon the state of mind, knowledge, emotions or intent.9 But
many courts have held that a party is bound by his testimony when he
testifies positively to what he may reasonably be assumed to know,
whether objective or subjective. 0 Thus, if a party testifies positively
and unequivocally to basic facts as to which there is little likelihood
of error, and if he makes no subsequent modification or correction
under claim of confusion or mistake, he will not be allowed to avert
the consequences of his testimony by the introduction of or reliance
on other evidence in the case." But the rule as applied in the better
reasoned cases has been a flexible one; the character of the testimony
the Harlow case itself misapplied the distinction. 'The elusive distinction which
these cases attempt rests upon the premise that 'When a party testifies to
facts in regard to which he has special knowledge, such as his own motives,
purposes, or knowledge, or his reasons for acting as he did, the possibility
that he may be honestly mistaken disappears.' Harlow v. Laclair .... If -he is
human, it does not disappear. Knowledge may be 'special' without being
correct. Often we little note nor long remember our 'motives, purposes, or
knowledge.' There are few, if any, subjects on which plaintiffs are infallible."
Id. at 331-32.
7. Kanopka v. Kanopka, 113 Conn. 30, 154 Atl. 144 (1931); Cote v. Stafford,
94 N.H. 251, 51 A.2d 144 (1947); Leonard v. Smith, 186 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945); Burruss v. Suddith, 187 Va. 473, 47 S.E.2d 546 (1948).
8. Hill v. West End St. Ry., 158 Mass. 458, 33 N.E. 582 (1893). '"There is no
sound reason why the familiar doctrine that a party may contradict, though
not impeach, his own witness, should not, if the circumstances are consistent
with honesty and good faith, be applied when he is himself the witness; nor,
under the same circumstances, is there any reason why, to prove material facts
denied by his own testimony, he may not rely on the testimony of witnesses
called by the adverse party.. .
9: See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sullivan, 330 Mass. 549, 116 N.E.2d 128 (1953);
McFaden v. Nordblom, 307 Mass. 574, 30 N.E.2d 852 (1941); Rueger v. Hawks,
150 Neb. 834, 36 N.W.2d 236 (1949).
10. Davis v. Akridge, 199 Ga. 867, 36 S.E.2d 102 (1945); Tennes v. Tennes,
320 Ill. App. 19, 50 N.E.2d 132 (1943); Green v. Higbee, 176 Kan. 596, 272
P.2d 1084 (1954); Kight v. American Eagle, Fire Ins. Co., 125 Fla. 608, 170 So.
664 (1936), (dictum on rehearing).
11. "It appears from these decisions that among the circumstances which
should be considered in such a case are the following: (1) Was the party at the
time when, the occurrence-about which he testified took place, and when he
testified, in full possession of his-mental faculties? (2) Was his intelligence
and command of English such that' he^ fully understood -the purport of the
questions and his answers thereto? (3) What was the nature of the facts to
which he testified? Was he simply giving his impressions of an eventas a
participant or an observer, or was he testifying to facts peculiarly within- his
own knowledge? (4) Is-his testimony contradicted by that of other witnesses?
(5) Is the effect of his-testimony clear and unequivocal, or are his statements
inconsistent and conflicting?'- Harlow v. Laclair, 82 N.H. 506, 136 Atl. 128,-,131
(1927). ' ' "
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and the attendant circumstances of the case are weighed in determin-
ing whether the testimony is within the party's peculiar knowlege.12
In the instant case the court followed the rule which it had formu-
lated in Sutherland v. Davis.13 In that case the testimony in question
concerned the party's state of mind on the issue of contributory negli-
gence. The court pointed out that each case should be viewed in the
light of the "conditions and circumstances" which might "give rise
to the probability of error in the party's own testimony.' 4 The rule
apparently was extended in the instant case by the holding that plain-
tiff was bound by testimony as to objective facts. However, as the
court noted, plaintiff "was in a favorable position to observe accurately
what occurred."' 5 It is important that the court did not set up an
arbitrary rule that all testimony as to objective facts may constitute
a judicial admission.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-"PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL"
CLAUSE-UNIQUELY GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY
Petitioners' tug and towed barge went aground on an island in the
Gulf of Mexico, causing extensive damage to the barge's cargo. Claim-
ing that the accident was due to the negligence of Coast Guard person-
nel in failing to maintain the light in the island's lighthouse, petitioners
brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' .The district court granted the Government's motion to
dismiss on the ground that the act did not extend the liability of the
Government to a "uniquely governmental" activity. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam. Held (5-4),2 re-
versed. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the Government is liable for
injuries caused by the negligence of its employees in the performance
of a uniquely governmental activity if a private individual would be
liable under like circumstances. Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
The Federal Tort Claims Act is regarded as the expression by Con-
gress of its desire to modify the sovereign immunity of the United
States and to minimize the burdensome practice of private relief bills
12. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2594a (3d ed. 1940).
13. 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (1941).
14. Id., 151 S.W.2d at 1024.
15. 284 S.W.2d at 816.
1:28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80
"(1950).
2. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Reed,
joined by Justices Clark, Burton, and Minton, dissented.
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by allowing tort actions in the federal district courts.3 The United
States Supreme Court generally adheres to the proposition that the
act should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the Con-
gressional purpose.4 The problem raised by the instant case is the
extent of the Government's liability in view of its identification with
the liability of "a private individual under like circumstances. '
5
The two principal Supreme Court decisions construing the Govern-
ment's liability under this clause prior to the instant case are Feres v.
United States6 and Dalehite v. United States.7 In the Feres case the
Court held that the Government is not liable under the act for injuries
to servicemen arising out of or incident to military service. 8 The
apparent rationale was that where Congress has provided an ade-
quate system of compensation for injuries arising out of a particular
activity,9 its tacit intention is to exclude recovery under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. The opinion also indicated, however, that no
liability would be found if the activity and the relationship it es-
tablished between the litigants was uniquely governmental. 10 In
the Dalehite case the Court refused to impose liability on the Govern-
ment for injuries arising out of the Texas City holocaust. 'The de-
cision rested principally on the holding that the injuries arose in con-
nection with the performance of a discretionary activity,"- but in part
rested on the rationalization that negligence of the Coast Guard while
fighting a shipboard fire is not actionable because there is no analogous
3. See Aron, Federal Tort Claims Act: Comments and Questions for Prac-
ticing Lawyers, 33 A.B.A.J. 226, 227 (1947); Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims
Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1946). - -
4. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); United States v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949). In the Aetna case the Court
quoted Judge Cardozo's famous statement: "The exemption of 'the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We
are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where consent has
been announced," from Anderson v. John L. Hayes Coristr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140,
153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926). But cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
5. "The United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.. . ." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2674 (1950). Certain express restrictions coextensive with this definition
are set forth in sections 2674 and 2680 6f the act, but are not pertinent to the
present discussion.
6. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
7. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). This and the Feres decision were thought contfolling
by the dissenting Justices in the instant case.
8. It is interesting to note that service personnel on furlough are not
engaged in activity "incident to service," and therefore "may recover from
the Government for injuries suffered during that period. Brooks v. United
States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
9. Compensation for injuries or death of armed servicea personnel is pro-
vided in 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 718, 725, 731, 740, 741 (1954).
10. 340 U.S. at 142. Cf. Yellow Cab Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 543, 548
(1951), in which the Court said, "This Act does not subject the Government
to a previously unrecognized type of obligation."
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (a) (1950) exempts the Government from liability for




liability in general tort law.12 The Court reasoned that private in-
dividuals do not fight fires; that municipalities are not liable for the
injurious acts of their firefighters; and, therefore, the act did not im-
pose liability on the Government while engaged in this activity. Both
these cases narrowed the scope of the act, and consequently left the
question of the extent of the Government's liability very much in
doubt.13
Numerous lower federal courts have also considered the extent of
the Government's liability under the "private individual" clause, and
their opinions have reflected the continuing difficulty of the problem.
The statements in the Feres and Dalehite decisions relating to uniquely
governmental activity were endorsed in dictum by one court of ap-
peals, 4 but in general the lower courts have reached conclusions which
imposed liability on the Government. They have allowed recovery for
injuries caused by the negligence of municipal airport control tower
personnel, 15 government airport employees, 16 a soldier standing guard
duty,17 a Coast Guard helicopter officer conducting rescue operations, 18
and government employees engaged in marking a submerged wreck 19
-all of which involved purely governmental activity.
The decision in the instant case seems to confirm the general climate
of opinion prevalent in the lower courts and to modify the Court's
approach to the problem as expressed in the Feres and DaZehite
opinions. The Court made it clear that whether the activity was
proprietary or governmental was immaterial;20 when the Government
undertakes the operation of navigational aids it acquires a duty to the
public to act with care.2 ' Consequently, a breach of this duty will
impose liability. The decision was based on the belief that since
almost any governmental activity on the "operating level" could be
12. "[AJn alleged failure or carelessness of public firemen does not create
private actionable rights." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953).
Foi a more thorough analysis'of the case, see Heuser, DaZehite v. United
States: A New Approach to the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 7 VAND. L. REV. 175
(1954).
13. For a discussion of the law on this subject prior to the instant case, see
O'Donoghue, Sonte Possible New Fields in a Narrowing Act, 7 VAND. L. Ray.
180 (1954). See also Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Mis-
administration, 5 VAxD. L. REv. 167 (1952).
14. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 277 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). Contra, Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 112
F. Supp. 792, 795 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (dictum), af'd, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
15. Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd,
221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.) (modifying amount of recovery), ajFd per curiam,
350 U.S. 907 (1955).
16. Air Transp. Associates, Inc. v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
17. Cerri r. 'United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
18. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
19. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States,' 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
20. The distinction had earlier been refuted in more explicit terms by the
lower federal courts.' Air Transp. Associates, Inc. v. United States, 221 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1955); 'Cerri v., United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
21. See also Union Trust Co. v. United States, note 15 supra.
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done by a private person, Congress did not intend to predicate, the
Government's liability on the "fortuitous presence or absence of
identical private activity." The real test, therefore, would seem to
be not whether private persons actually engage in such activity but
whether they could conceivably do so.
The decision seems sound. To begin with, the doctrine that the-act
should be liberally construed not only seems inherently just but is
supported by abundant authority.22 Secondly, whatever may be the
technical distinctions between sovereign and proprietary acts, to de-
termine the Government's liability on this basis would nullify Con-
gress' attempt to effectuate a practical administration of just claims.
Thirdly, the act identified the Government with a private individual
-not a state, municipal corporation, or other legal entity. The indi-
vidual has never been protected by the cloak of sovereign immunity.
Why should the Government, now in his shoes with regard to sovereign
acts on an operational level, be so protected? It seems fortunate, at
any rate, that the determination of the Government's liability in this
type of situation was not based on a consideration of whether the act
created new private rights or merely waived sovereign immunityp3
INCOME TAXATION-CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES--
BUSINESS PURPOSE FOR CONTRACTING IN
COMMODITY FUTURES
Petitioner, a .corn products manufacturer, entered into futures
purchase contracts' as part of its regular corn buying program to
protect itself against increases in the price of spot corn and to provide
an adequate supply of raw corn without additional storage costs. De-
livery was taken on these contracts when necessary to petitioner's
operations and the remainder were sold if no shortage was imminent.
If shortages did appear futures were sold only to offset purchases of
spot corn Gains and losses realized on these sales were reported as
ordinary profit and loss, but in this suit petitioner contended that any
22. See note 3 supra. See also Gilroy-v. United States, 112'F. Supp. 664
(D.D.C. 1953); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 6204,
6302-03 (3d ed., Horack 1943); James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 15
NACCA L.J. 281 (1955).
23. The Court evidently felt that this consideration Was immaterial and
would only create needless confusion. The dissenting Justices, howevek, took
a different approach, apparently relying heavily on the theory that the act
created no new private rights. . . -
1. A futures contract is an.agreement to purchase or sell a fixed amaount
of a certain commodity, at a designated future' date for a fixed price. It does
not include a sale of a cash commodity for deferred shipment or.delivery.
See 42 STAT. 998 (1922), 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. 1955).
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gain or loss from the sale of its futures should have been treated as
arising from the sale of a capital asset. Certiorari was granted to
review a judgment of the court of appeals affirming a determination
by the Tax Court that the futures were not capital assets.2 Held, af-
firmed. The futures transactions were not so divorced from the every-
day operation of the company's business as to come within the con-
gressional purpose of providing preferential treatment for transactions
in property which are not the normal source of business income. Corn
Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
Being a question of policy, the special tax treatment accorded gains
and losses on certain dispositions of property classified as "capital
assets' 3 has frequently presented the federal courts with the problem
bf finding that elusive criterion-the intent or purpose of Congress.
4
Specifically, the problem with regard to a contract in commodity
futures has been one of classification.5 Such contracts would normally
appear to be capital assets within the statutory definition which ex-
cepts only certain types of property directly related to the taxpayer's
trade or business;6 however, many transactions involving the purchase
and sale of futures have all the earmarks of dealing in the ordinary
course of business. In the earlier enactments of the Revenue Code
the definition of capital assets included a two year holding period.
7
Since exchange rules have always required futures contracts to be
closed out within a shorter period, any dealing in futures necessarily
produced ordinary gain or loss. However, the time requirement was
eliminated in 19348 to prevent security holders from taking timely
losses which entirely offset ordinary income.9 The change in definition
focused attention on those taxpayers who used futures for hedging
2. Tax Court opinion commented on in 65 HARv. L. REV. 187 (1951).
3. See note 6 infra.-
4. See Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under
the Federal Income Tax. 1913-1948,2 NAT'L TAX J. 12'(1949).
5. The Supreme Court has classified parties dealing in futures as: (1) those
who use them to hedge; (2) legitimate capitalists; and (3) gamblers or irre-
sponsible speculators. United States v. N. York Coffee and Sugar Exchange,
Inc., 263 U.S. 611, 619 (1924). The difficulty of classification was noted in a
previous discussion of this topic: "While the stigma of wagering will be
rarely applied, the distinction between hedging and legitimate investment
will -survive as a recurrent issue." Note, Trading in Commodity Futures Under
Federal Income Tax Statutes, 51 YALE L. J. 505, 511 (1942).
6. Under the present code, the term "capital asset" includes all property
held by the taxpayer except: (1) stock in trade or property includable in
inventory or property held primarily for sale to customers; (2) depreciable
business property or real property used in the business; (3) certain literary
works; (4) accounts receivable; (5) certain government obligations. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954 § 1221.
7. Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, § 206, 42 STAT. 233.
8. Revenue Act of 1934, c. 277, § 117, 48 STAT. 714.
9. See Commissioner v. Covington, 120 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 822 (1942) (concurring opinion applied the congressional
purpose to transactions in commodity futures).
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purposes10 and the Treasury Department distinguished such transac-
tions from mere speculations." This distinction subsequently con-
trolled the classification of futures and unfortunately emphasized the
true hedge while failing to recognize similar business purposes for
futures transactions.
Conversely from the opposing contentions in the instant case, almost
all the litigation in point has involved taxpayers seeking ordinary loss
treatment when the Commissioner has determined that losses on the
futures market were capital losses subject to the statutory limitation.12
The first decision applying the Treasury Department's interpretation
found in favor of a wheat farmer who had dealt in futures to protect
against fluctuations in the price of wheat. 3 This decision, however,
was followed by a leading case which allowed only capital loss to a
manufacturer of crude cottonseed oil who had used refined oil futures
for reasons of business necessity.14 The theory of the opinion was that
the taxpayer did not establish a true hedge because "it had no actual
commodity on hand or future commitments to be protected from
price variations."'5 This strict application continued in several sub-
sequent decisions, the courtis finding that futures were not stock in
trade, property includable in inventory nor property held primarily
for sale to customers. 16 However, in two substantially identical cases
before the Tax Court a business purpose for contracting in commodity
futures was satisfactorily shown. In each case a manufacturer, holding
a large inventory of raw materials and fearing a decline in its market
value, entered into futures sales contracts as a protective measure.
Actually the market rose and losses were incurred when the con-
tracts were closed out. Ordinary loss was allowed on the principle
that this was a hedging transaction.'
7
10. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 249 (1905).
See also Browne v. Thorn, 260 U.S. 137, 139 (1922); Commissioner v. Farmers
& Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
683 (1941).
11. "[H]edging transactions are essentially to be regarded as insurance
rather than a dealing in capital assets ... " G.C.M. 17322, XV-2 Cum. BuLL.
151, 155 (1936).
12. The present limitation is that capital losses are allowed only to the
extent of capital gains and $1000 of ordinary income. INT. REV. CODX OF 1954
§ 1211. As a necessary corollary to the special treatment afforded capital gains,
the allowance of capital losses has been limited in varying ways since 1924.
Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, § 208, 43 STAT. 263.
13. Ben Grote, 41 B.T.A. 247 (1940).
14. Commissioner v. Farmers & Ginners Cotton Oil Co., 120 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941).
15. Id. at 774.
16. Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th" Cir. 1945);
Commissioner v. Banfield, 122 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1941); Estate of Dorothy
Makransky, 5 T.C. 397 (1945), affd per curiam, 154 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1946);
Tennessee Egg Co.; 47 B.T.A. 558 (1942). See cases collected in 3 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 22.07 (Supp. 1955).
17. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 22 T.C. 1044 (1954); Stewart Silk Corp.,
9 T.C. 174 (1947).
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-In the instant case the Supreme Court sidestepped the inadequate
hedge test and found ordinary income because the taxpayer dealt in
futures as an integral part of its business operations.18 The futures
purchase contracts were used both as a measure of insurance in the
acquisition of raw materials and as a substitute for the commodity it-
self.19 To classify these operations as capital asset transactions ob-
viously would have distorted the taxpayer's income picture.20 The de-
cision serves to emphasize that for the purpose of classifying property
as capital assets, the controlling factor should be the kind of taxpayer
dealing with the property and the use to which it is put rather than
the nature of the property itself.21 A proper result was reached by
relying on the purpose behind the legislative enactment when literal
adherence to the statutory language might not have fulfilled that
purpose.
LABOR LAW-TAFT-HARTLEY ACT-DISCHARGE OF
. EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP
Respondent, operator of a small trucking line, employed two persons
in its service department. When these employees joined a labor
union and the union sought to include them in its uniform contract,
which would raise the wages of each by about fifty cents an hour,
respondent eliminated the service department and discharged the
employees. The union then filed a complaint with the NLRB charging
violations of the Taft-Hartley Act's provisions against discrimination
in employment because of union membership.1 A trial examiner
found that respondent closed the service department because it
18. This approach had been suggested in a thorough analysis of the problem
of classifying commodity futures. However, the remedial legislation advocated
in that discussion appears unnecessary in view of the instant decision. Rich &
Rippe, Tax Aspects of Commodity Futures Transactions With a Business Pur-
pose, 2 TAX L. REv. 541 (1947).
19. 350 U.S. at 50.
20. "It is clear that the prices for futures have a direct relation to, and effect
upon, the prices in 'spot' sales." United States v. New York Coffee and Sugar
Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 611, 616 (1924). Where the futures sales were matched
by purchases of spot corn, the cost of raw materials was actually reflected in the
price of the futures purchase contracts. Thus, the cost of goods manufactured
would have been unrealistic if these were classified as separate and independent
transactions.
21. Cf. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (lump sum payment to
lessor for cancellation of lease was a substitute for the rent and not a return
of capital); Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1014 (1954) (proceeds, above face amount of notes in default as to
interest constituted ordinary income where seller had status of lender rather
than investor).




could not be profitably maintained at the higher wages. The Board
rejected this finding and ordered respondent to reinstate the employees
and to award them appropriate back pay. Upon respondent's re-
fusal to comply, the Board brought this action to enforce its order.
Held, enforcement denied. Where the evidence shows a legitimate
economic reason for the discharge of employees, a finding of union
discrimination is not justified, notwithstanding that the reason stems
from the employees' union membership. NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co.,
226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
At common law an employer's right to hire and fire his employees
for any reason whatsoever was inviolate.2 The Taft-Hartley Act pro-
tects the right of the individual to engage in or refrain from union
membership and activity. Accordingly, it limits the traditional power
of the employer by providing that discrimination in regard to hiring,
firing, or other terms of employment is an unfair labor practice when
the desired objective is to encourage or discourage membership in
a labor organization.3 However, union membership in and of itself
does not guarantee to any employee the right to be free from dis-
charge. 4 In all cases involving the moving of a particular plant or
department, the NLRB has sought to determine whether or not the
motive behind the action was an illegal discrimination.3 The tradi-
tional remedy for such discrimination has been the award of back
pay from the date of discharge to the date of an offer of reinstatement,
together with reinstatement in the same or similar position.6 Where
there was a clear showing that the employer acted from economic
motives in moving his shop and discharging the employees, the Board
has dismissed the complaint.7 Examples of economic motives are the
conclusion of an experimental project and the unusual expense in-
curred in maintaining a certain post.8 In many cases, however, the
2. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v.
Cape County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1944); Mechanics' Foundry &
Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504, 128 N.E. 877 (1920); Paul v. Mencher,
169 Misc. 657, 7 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
3. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3) (1956).
4. NLRB v. Supreme Bedding & Furniture Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 997 (5th Cir.
1952); NLRB v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, 179 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1950); NLRB
v. Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 171 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1948); NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus
Ass'n, 147 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1945).
5. NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950); Mount Hope
Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953); Joseph E. Cote, 101 N.L.R.B. 1486
(1952); Barr Marketing Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 875 (1951).
6. See 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsPUTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 992 (1940).
7. NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v.
Fuchs Baking Co., 207 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Machine Products
Co.. 198 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1952); Utah Construction Co.. 95 N.L.R.B. 30
(1951); Southern Fruit Distributors Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1948). ,
8. NLRB v. Fuchs Baking Co., 207 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1953); Frank P. Slater,
102 N.L.R.B. 153 (1953); Arthur G. McKee & Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 399 (1951);
W. Hawley & Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1127 (1951); Sub G-ade Engineering Co., 93




discharge of the employees stems from a dual motivation on the
part of the employer.9 In these cases the test applied by the Board has
been whether or not there was a dominant anti-union motive-the
burden being upon the Board to show affirmatively that discrimina-
tion was the basis of discharge. 10 In the instant case the Board ap-
parently abandoned this test and held that respondent was guilty
of a prima facie unfair labor practice because the employees would
not have been discharged had they not joined the union.
The courts have held that when the Board could as reasonably
infer a proper motive as an unlawful one, an inference of illegality
is not supported by substantial evidence." This sharply contradicts
the policy adopted by the Board in the instant case, but the court
in denying enforcement of the Board's order concurred with the
majority of courts which have decided the issue.12 Had the Board
reached its decision by finding that respondent was motivated by both
anti-union and economic considerations, it seems likely that the court
would have sustained the order, giving weight to the economic con-
siderations as mitigating factors. This has been done in similar cases.
13
The instant case indicates that the Board needs to point out the
rationale which it plans to use in determining cases involving an
abandoned department. It is clear that those courts which have
passed upon this question will not sustain the Board when it bases
its decision upon a prima facie test. So long as the Board bases its
decision upon a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law, the
courts will allow the Board a wide discretion; but they feel free
to overturn a decision resting upon purely legal grounds.
NEGLIGENCE-HIGH TENSION POWER LINES-
DUTY TO WARN OF DANGEROUS CONDITION
Deceased was electrocuted while repairing his television antenna
which broke and came in contact with the defendant's high tension
wires. Plaintiff, administratrix, brought an action for wrongful death
9. NLRB v. National Die Casting, 207 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1953); John S.
Barnes Corp. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. E. C. Brown Co.,
184 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1950).
10. NLRB v. Mac Smith Garment Co., 203 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1953); NLRB
v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947).
11. See NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
1954). But see NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Drivers, 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB
v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 223 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
National Paper Co., 216 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
13. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954);
Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953).
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charging the power company with negligence in failing to warn
that the lines were high tension distribution wires which made con-
tact with them extremely dangerous. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for a compulsory nonsuit and plaintiff appealed.
HeLd (4-1), affirmed. An electric power company owes no duty to
warn of a dangerous condition merely because its wires contain a
high voltage charge.' Jowett v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 118 A.2d
452 (Pa. 1955).
Is the absence of a special contract, an electric company is held not
to be the insurer of the safety of the persons who may come in contact
with its appliances and are injured. 2 The liability of an electric com-
pany is based on negligence.3 Although each case depends largely
upon its own facts, there have developed from the litigation of cases
involving death and injuries resulting from contact with high tension
wires some general fact situations where a duty is said to exist on
the part of a power company.4 Generally a duty exists to prevent harm
coming to others from deadly current at places where they may be
reasonably expected to go,5 and to exercise such care as is commen-
surate with the danger involved. 6
The most frequent causes of electricity being out of bounds and
injuring others arise in fact situations involving defective insulation,
broken wires,8 sagging wires,9 and wires located in places where they
may be dangerous by reason of proximity to persons or to objects
which may carry the current where it will be harmful.10 There does not
1. No question was raised that the wires were in undue proximity to the
house or that they should have been insulated.
2. CuRTis, THE LAW OF ELEcmlcn"r § 400 (1915), and cases cited therein.
3. Ibid.
4. See Challener, Injuries Incident to the Production and Use of Electricity
in Pennsylvania, 24 Tmvrp. L.Q. 42 (1950); Feezer, Tort Liability of Suppliers
of Electricity, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 357 (1937).
5. Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 931 (1945); Lozano v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 70 Cal. App. 415, 161 P.2d 74 (1945); International
Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854, 867 (W.S. 1948).
See Sweatman v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., 101 Cal. App. 318, 281 Pac.
677 (1929). See also Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Hurley, 49 F.2d 681, 689
(8th Cir. 1931); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Shryrock, 180 Ark. 705, 22
S.W.2d 380 (1929) (duty of reasonable and prompt inspection of power lines);
Alabama Power Co. v. Matthews, 226 Ala. 614, 147 So. 889 (1933) (duty as
to proper construction and maintenance).
6. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 115 F.2d 706
(5th Cir. 1940); Lewis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 95 Cal. App. 60, 212: P.2d
243 (1949); 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 39 (1941). See CuRTis, THE LAW OF ELEc-
TRIcITY §§ 404-06 (1915), for the variety of expressions used by the courts
in an attempt to define more clearly the degree of care required.
7. Reynolds v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 21 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1927);
Walpole v. Tennessee Light & Power Co., 19 Tenn. App. 352, 89 S.W.2d 174
(M.S. 1935); Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 73 S.E.2d
425 (1952).
8. Hagerstown & F. Ry. v. State, 139 Md. 507, 115 Atl. 783, 19 A.L.R. 797
(1921).
9. Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 73 S.E.2d 425 (1952).
10. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139, Atl. 440,
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appear to be a duty on the part of a power company to give warning
of high tension wires because of that fact alone. However, it seems that
a power company does have a duty to give such warning if it knows
or reasonably should know that there is a danger of persons coming
in contact with its wires.'
In the instant case there were circumstances' 2 from which the
existence of a duty to warn might have been found. However, the
decision is in accord with the apparent weight of authority in holding
that there is no duty to warn just because the company's wires con-
tained a high voltage charge.
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-SEVERANCE OF ESTATE
BY MURDER OF CO-TENANT
The heir at law of a woman murdered by her husband sought to
have the court declare her entitled to an undivided half interest in
property which had been held jointly by the spouses, on the ground
that a-murderer should not benefit from his crime. The complaint
was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. On direct appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, held, reversed. When one of two joint
tenants murders the other, the act of murder prior to the death termi-
nates the tenancy and extinguishes the murderer's right of survivor-
ship before it becomes operative; thereafter the murderer and the
heirs of the deceased tenant hold legal title to the property as tenants
in common. Bradley v. Fox,7 Ill. 2d 206, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
Under traditional common-law property concepts the murder of
one joint tenant or tenant by the entirety' by the other operates to
56 A.L.R. 1011 (1927). See Annots., 14 A.L.R. 1023 (1921) (electric wire over
private property), 40 A.L.R.2d 1299' (1955) (electric wires--injury to adults).
11. Croxton v. Duke Power Co., 181 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1950) (no duty to
warn when power company could not be charged with knowledge of the
danger of persons coming in contact with its wires); Worley v. Kansas Electric
Power Co., 138 Kan. 69, 23 P.2d 494 (1933) (duty of power company to place
warning signs for the protection of those coming within danger zone); Lewis v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 95 Cal. App. 60, 212 P.2d 243 (1949) (crane operator
electrocuted-no duty to warn of high tension wires under the circumstances).
circumstances).
12. The plaintiff introduced evidence of the deceptive appearance of the
wires strung on poles owned by the telephone company; that the defendant
had written a number of property owners warning of the danger of antennae
coming in contact with the wires; and that the defendant's meter reader,
charged with the duty of reporting hazards, had a notation "T.V. Aerial" on
the page devoted to the plaintiff's house, thus tending to show that the de-
fendant was aware of the danger of the antenna coming in contact with the
wires.
1. "A tenancy by the entirety . . . is essentially a form of joint tenancy,
modified by the common-law theory that husband and wife are one person."
2 TiFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY 217 (3d ed. 1939). See also 4 THomrsoN, REAL PROP-
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extinguish all rights of survivorship in the decedent and establishes
the murderer as the sole owner of the property.2 This view is said to
follow logically from the rule that joint tenants individually hold the
entire estate subject to a right of survivorship in the surviving tenant.
Running counter to this result is the well-established equitable maxim
that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong
or to acquire property by his own crime.3 Efforts to effectuate this
equitable doctrine have been met first by the traditional property-
rule and second by the usual state constitutional prohibition against
forfeiture of estate because of conviction of a crime.
4
Solutions to this much discussed but seldom litigated problem are
represented by a confused variety of decisions. The traditional view
that the murderer acquires the entire estate is followed in one group
of cases.5 A second group gives all to the decedent's heirs and nothing
to the murderer. New York altogether bypasses legal barriers and
awards the entire estate to the victim's heirs.6 Wisconsin conceives
ERTY §§ 1803-26 (penn. ed. 1940). "[It] is sometimes referred to as a joint
tenancy." 26 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 66 (1940). The principal dif-
ference between the estates is that a tenancy by the entirety can be termi-
nated only by joint action of husband and wife during their lives, whereas
a joint tenancy may be terminated by a transfer of his interest by one tenant.
Illinois, however, has abolished tenancies by the entirety. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 68,
§ 9 (1947). Had it not, the tenancy in the instant case would have been by
the entirety, and perhaps the rationale of this court could not have been
employed. Though the annotators of the American Law Reports suggest that-
a distinction exists between joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety as
regards the disposition of property upon murder of one tenant by the other,
none of the leading cases turn upon this distinction. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1099,
1101 (1953).
2. For an excellent discussion of the common-law property concepts here
involved, see 2 Amucnw LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
3. BRoom, LEGAL MAxrMS 227 (7th ed. 1900). See AMES, Can a Murderer
Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It? in LEcTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 310
(1913); Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of the Problem in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 229 (1942).
4. E.g., "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense,
and no conviction shall work corruption of the blood or forfeiture of estate.
." ILL. CONST. art. II, § 11. See also TEN. .CONST. art. I, § 12.
5. Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950) (household goods
held jointly); Di Lalla v. Corea, 19 Pa. D. & C. 282 (C.P. 1933) (jointly held
bank account); Hammer v. Kinnan, 16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (C.P. 1931) (real
property held by the entirety); Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E.
838 (1935) (joint bank account); Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120
N.E.2d 330 (1953) (joint bank account); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88'
P.2d 972 (1939) (real property held by the entirety); Beddingfield v. Estill
& Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907) (real property held by the.
entirety). See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-
A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715 (1936).
6. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't
1935) (real property and bank account held in joint tenancy); Van Alstyne-
v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (real property
held by the entirety); In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y. Supp.
116 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (joint bank account); Cf. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y.
506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889Y (intestacy). It has been said that the-Van Alstyne
case purports to apply the constructive trust view. 3 ScOTT, TRUSTS 2384 n.3
(1939); Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-In New York, 20 N.Y.U:L.Q. REV.
424, 425 '(1945);. 11 B.U.L. REV. 129; 130 (1931). A doubtful 1953 decision from
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the joint tenancy as continuing in the victim's heirs, refusing to recog-
nize the effect of the crime and vesting legal title in the victim's heirs
upon the slayer's death.7 Minnesota allows legal title to vest in the
murderer but gives beneficial ownership to the heirs by the imposition
of a constructive trust.
8
A third group, representing the majority of modern decisions,
divides the property in differing ways between the murderer and the
victim's heirs by imposition of a constructive trust upon some part of
the legal interest vested in the survivor. The language of some of the
opinions is seriously confused, creating misunderstanding as to
whether legal or equitable title goes to the heirs of the decedent.9
Some of the courts have given an equitable life interest in half the
estate to the heirs, and disposed of the remainder by a conclusive pre-
sumption that the murderer would have predeceased the victim'0 or
have given the remainder to the tenant whose life expectancy had
been the longer, in one case even giving the remainder to the slayer."
The Delaware court imposed a constructive trust on all the property
but allowed the murderer the commuted value of half for life.12 The
courts of two other jurisdictions have given a beneficial fee in half
the property to the decedent, in effect reducing the tenancy to a ten-
ancy in common.
13
A fourth view adopted in a few recent cases involving real property
Ohio, cited for this proposition, but distinguishable because the joint banking
contract had no survivorship clause, in Bauman v. Walter, 160 Ohio St. 273,
116 N.E.2d 435 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 947 (1954).
7. In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952) (real and personal
property held jointly), criticized in 1953 Wis. L. REv. 567.
8. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952) (bank account held
jointly).
9. The source of this confusion may be traced to Barnett v. Couey, 224
Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757, 760 (1930) (bank deposit held by the entirety),
which said, "conceding, but not deciding, that full legal title may pass to the
[survivor] ... [the court] will treat him as a constructive trustee." Following
this case, this issue was further confused by Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874,
211 S.W.2d 464 (1948), and hopelessly entangled in Cowan v. Pleasant, 263
S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1953), in which the court cited the Barnett case as
authority for its conclusion, but stated that the "heirs, however, are entitled
to his one-half of the property, just as would have occurred in the event
the marital relation had been severed."
10. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927) (real property held
by the entirety). Though the deceased victim's life expectancy was greater
than the survivor's, the court indulged the conclusive presumption that be-
cause the slayer "by his crime took away his wife's interest . . . he must be
held a constructive trustee for the benefit of her heirs." 137 S.E. at 191.
11. Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952) (real pronerty held
by the entirety and personal nroperty held jointly); Sherman v. Weber, 113
N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (Ch. 1933) (real property held by the entirety;
remainder to murderer whose life expectancy was the longer).
12. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951) (realty held by the
entirety).
13. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1951) (real property held by the
entirety); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951) (real property held
by the entirety); Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948) (real
property held by the entirety); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d
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held by the entirety is that the wrongdoer by his felonious act dis-
solves the marital relationship and creates a tenancy in common.14 The
instant decision apparently extends this analysis to a joint tenancy. In
rendering its decision, however, the Illinois court employed a some-
what obscurely phrased rationale. Recognizing that the murderer does
in practical effect benefit by the operation of his right of survivorship,
the court utilized a preventive rather than a remedial application of
the principle that a murderer may not benefit from his wrongdoing.
The joint tenancy was deemed severed into a tenancy in common
before the victim's death by the murderer's breach of an implied con-
dition in the contract of joint tenancy that neither tenant shall ter-
minate the estate by murdering the other. Thus the crime itself pre-
vented maturation of the murderer's right of survivorship and the
constitutional provision against forfeiture of estate was not violated
by the result reached.
15
This rationale presents three doubtful elements. First, the court
assumed that each tenant in practical effect owns half the estate de-
spite the common-law concept that the entire estate is vested in each
tenant subject to a right of survivorship in his co-tenant. 16 Either
tenant may sever the tenancy and secure an undivided half interest
in the property. Noting this, the court inferred that the entire interest
of each tenant is equal to an undivided half. Thus conclusion may not
be accurate in all cases, for the right of survivorship of one tenant
may render his interest considerably more valuable than a mere
undivided half.
Second, the court found that the crime of murder logically occurs
prior to the victim's death. It is too well settled for argument that a
murder cannot exist without a death, and it should logically follow
that one is not a murderer until the sufferor has died. Even then,
if the victim lives more than a year and a day there is no murder
though he may die as a direct consequence of the culpable act.17 A
few old cases contain language suggesting that the crime and the
757 (1930) (bank deposit held by the entirety). All four cases have been
cited as giving legal title to half the property to the deceased's heirs; see
note 9 supra, for the source of misunderstanding regarding their holdings;
i.e., 37 VM/x. L. REV. 71, 73 (1952).
14. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1951), criticized in 6 Wyo. L.J.
266 (1952); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Cowan v. Pleas-
ant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953); Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841
(1954). Perhaps Barnett v. Couey and Grose v. Holland, supra, likewise stand
for this proposition, but as pointed out in note 9 supra, this is doubtful.
15. See 44 ILL. B.J. 353, 357-58 (1956).
16. According to the common-law concept of joint tenancy, the killer took
all his interest when he became joint tenant in the first place, and therefore"
was not enriched by the killing. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn.
39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
17. State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 658, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); cases collected in
Annot.. 20 A.L.R. 1006 (1922). Contra, People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191




-death may be separated, but their authority for this proposition is
doubtful.
18
:.Third, an implied condition against termination of the tenancy by
murder creates a heretofore unrecognized mode of severing the joint
estate during the lives of the tenants. 19 The ordinary modes have been
deemed to be severance of one of the four unities which are the foun-
dation of the estate 0 by unilateral or mutual alienation of their in-
terests by the parties or by mutual agreement, upon which a tenancy
in common would result. Murder of a co-tenant, even assuming that
it occurs before death, does not appear to sever any of the unities.
It has been suggested that the best solution to the problem of the
instant case lies in the employment of the constructive trust theory.2'
Although the court discussed that form of relief with evident approv-
al, it recognized that once the survivor's legal and beneficial interests
are indefeasibly vested, deprivation of those rights would work a
forfeiture.22 To avoid the necessity of legal fictions it has been forcibly
suggested that the problem can best be handled by legislation directed
to that end.
2 3
-. TORTS-LANDOWNER-DUTY TO SOCIAL GUEST
Plaintiff, a relative of defendant making a social visit in defendant's
home, received injuries when she slipped on grease left upon defend-
ant's steps. Plaintiff asserted that the conduct of any occupier of land
toward any entrant thereon should be examined under the general
principles of negligence to determine whether the occupier acted rea-
18. Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 64 N.W. 446 (1895) (the crime is com-
mitted at the time the wound is inflicted though death is subsequent); see
cases collected in Annot., 34 L.R.A. 851 (1897); 26 Am. JuR., Homicide §237 (1940) ("[for determining the situs] the death is regarded as a mere
consequence [of the crime]").• 19. It would perhaps be more difficult to imply this constructive condition
into a tenancy by the entirety than into a joint tenancy. In the former, each
tenant holds pur tout, and the consent of both is necessary to terminate the
relation; but in the latter, each tenant holds pur my et pur tout, and either
may -cause severance unilaterally. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6
(Casner ed. 1952). Hence, because the joint tenancy is essentially contractual,
.nd the tenancy by the entirety essentially a property interest, it is easier to
imply a condition into the joint tenancy.
20. These are the unities of time, title, interest and possession. 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
, 21. RESTATEMENT, RESTITuTIoN § 188a (1937), proposes that the trust be
impressed to the extent that the murderer has enlarged his interest and states
that age, health, and other factors of life expectancy are immaterial. 3 ScoTT,
TRUsTs 2398 (1939), advocates the same view; accord, 2 VAND. L. R-v. 147 n.11
(1948); 9 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 149 (1952).
22. Instant case, 129 N.E.2d at 705.
-23. See Wade, Acquisition of Pronerty bu Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
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sonably -under all of -the circumstances, and that this was a question
for the jury. The trial court upheld plaintiff's contention. The court of
appeals reversed,1 but the case was transferred to the state supreme
court for final determination. Held, trial court reversed. The duty of
the host to a social visitor is not determined by due care under the
circumstances, but is governed by the historical rule that a social
guest in the home is a mere licensee who can recover only when his
injury is the result of active or affirmative negligence of the host.
Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
Historically, the duty owed by an occupier of land to one injured on
the land due to defects therein was determined by classifying the
visitor as a trespasser, invitee or licensee,2 and applying a set of rules
peculiar to the category into which he fell. Since the leading English
case of Southcote v. Stanley3 in 1856, the social visitor has been classi-
fied as a licensee to whom no general duty exists to use care to make
the premises safe.4 Although the Southcote case has been criticized as
founded on now rejected grounds,5 its rule has been applied by the
majority of the American jurisdictions which have considered the
question.6 The host's duty is generally expressed as identical with
the duty owed to an ordinary licensee who takes the premises as he
finds them, but is protected from injury from something on the prem-
ises in the nature of a trap or from the host's affirmative conduct.
7
1. Wolfson v. Chelist, 278 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1955).
2. The Restatement of Torts renames invitees "business visitors" and
licensees "gratuitous licensees." 2 RESTATEmNT, TORTS §§ 331-33 (1934).
3. 1 H. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856).
4. The guest may 'maintain no action, for there was no act of commission,
but simply an act of omission." Id., 156 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
5. It is argued that the rule of the servant's assuming the risk having been
changed, the analogy between the guest and servant expressed by a justice
in the Southcote opinion is no longer accurate. The court in the instant case
recognized this criticism, but felt that the rule of the Southcote case is not
unjust to the parties. Instant case, 284 S.W.2d at 451.
6. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952). The popularity of the rule may result
largely from its consistency with society's concept of the sacredness of the
home. See 53 MicH. L. REv. 1011, 1012 (1955). Apparently, the first American
case of liability to a guest is Greenfield v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834
(1921). Until recently, however, there have been few cases. Compare 25 A.L.R.-
2d 598 (1952) with 12 A.L.R. 987 (1921) and 92 A.L.R. 1005 (1934). Perhaps this
recent frequency reflects the spread of liability insurance. James, Tort Liabil-
ity of Occupier's of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YAiu L.J.
605, 612 (1954).
One of the principal foundations of the rule-the common-law sanctity of
the landowner-has been criticized as having no place in the modern law of
torts. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and
Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182, 359 (1953). See also 1955 CAMv. L.J. 1, 6.
7. See, e.g., Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1934); Green-
field v. Miller, 173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834 (1921). See also HAaPm, TORTS § 96
(1933); 38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 117 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 32 (1950).
The licensee classification is most often invoked to deny the host's liability
for harm caused by a concealed danger of which he was not aware, but which
would have been discoverable by inspection. See, e.g., Vogel v. Eckhert, 22




Some American cases8 have adopted a slightly different standard of
duty, following the Restatement of Torts.9 This standard imposes a
special liability to the gratuitous licensee'0 involving a duty to warn
the guest of concealed dangers when the host has actual knowledge of
them, realizes they constitute an unreasonable'risk to the guest, and
has reason to believe that the guest will not discover them by the
exercise of ordinary care.1 1
Efforts to avoid the manifest inequities of the social-guest-licensee
doctrine have found fruition in three principal ways. The most frequent
method of circumventing the rule is to urge, where at all plausible,
that the guest was a business visitor rather than a licensee. Courts
have gone far in finding business purpose in the visit in order to allow
recovery by the visitor.12 Another method of evading the rule was
adopted by the Ohio court in Scheibel v. Lipton.13 There the court
held that a social guest is neither a licensee nor an invitee but belongs
in a separate duty-category simply as a social guest. However, the
standard of case set out is quite similar to the orthodox one.
1'
A third escape from the majority view was urged by the plaintiff in
the instant case, namely, to apply the ordinary rules of negligence.'5
A New York case has language which may support this argument, but
the issue has not yet been finally decided in that state.16 In England, the
8. See Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1950), and Comment, 4 U.
FLA. L. REV. 122 (1951); Mitchell v. Legarsky, 95 N.H. 214, 60 A.2d 136 (1948)
(host with knowledge of torn linoleum and realization of the risk to his social
guest held liable for guest's injuries).
9. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 342 (1934).
10. 2 id. at 932.
11. But cf. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573
(1942).
12. In Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942), for
example, it was held that an alumnus returning for a class reunion at com-
mencement was an "invitee" while on the premises of the university. This case
was criticized by a noted writer in the field of torts: "It is not easy . . . to
discover a 'business visitor' in an old grad, wandering about university prop-
erty at 2: 00 o'clock in the morning to find a place to urinate." Harper, Licensor-
Licensee, Tweedledum-Tweedledee, 25 CONN. B.J. 123, 125 (1951). The state-
ment in the Guilford case that one invited to the premises is entitled to the
status of invitee, though widely cited, was later thought to be "too broad."
Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693, 697 (1951). See also Kalinow-
ski v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 17 Wash. 2d 380, 135 P.2d 852 (1943)
(chaperone at YWCA dance is an invitee).
13. 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
14. The duty owed is to exercise ordinary care not to cause injury to the
guest by any act of the host or by any activity carried on by the host while
the guest is on the premises, coupled with the duty to warn the guest of any
condition known to the host and which one of ordinary prudence and fore-
sight in his position would reasonably consider dangerous if the host has reason
to believe that the guest does not know and will not discover the dangerous
condition for himself. Id., 102 N.E.2d at 463.
15. Plantiff suggested several factors for the jury to consider in determining
due care. Instant case, 284 S.W.2d at 449.
16. There is "no decision by the court of last resort of . . .New York .
dealing with the general subject of the duty owed by a host to a social guest."
Schiebel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453, 461 (1951). In Bogateroff
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third report of the Law Reform Committee recommended the abolition
of the existing categories of invitees and licensees, and the substitution
of one uniform duty of care owed by the occupier of premises to all
persons coming upon them at his invitation or by his permission, ex-
press or implied.17 This test is, essentially, "reasonable care to see that
the premises are reasonably safe."'18
It would seem that there is substantial merit to the argument put
forth in the instant case, but as yet no court has adopted it in the
ordinary host and guest situation although it is recognized in the
analogous driver-host and passenger-guest cases.' 9 While the limits of
the application of the ordinary rules of negligence might be difficult
to define, there should be no reason why they could not serve ade-
qdately to determine the liability of the host to his injured guest.
20
WILLS-PRETERMITTED HEIR STATUTE-SOLE GIFT TO
CHILD DEFEATED BY ACT OF TESTATOR
After execution of her will, testatrix sold a parcel of realty which
was the sole gift to her son. During probate of the will the son
brought a petition to determine heirship, contending that the sale of
the land revoked the only portion of the will wherein he was men-
tioned and left him an omitted child entitled to take an intestate
share under the pretermitted heir statute.' The trial court denied the
claim, ruling that because the petitioner was mentioned in -the will
the failure of the devise must be deemed intentional and, therefore,
the statute was inapplicable. Held (3-2), reversed. A testatrix's sale of
property previously devised to a child revokes that portion of the will,
and unless it appears elsewhere in the will that the failure to provide
was intentional, the child is entitled to share in the estate as a pre-
v. Caplan, 108 N.Y.S.2d 205, 207 (Sup. Ct. 1951), a.lower court held that the oc-
cupier owed the social guest who stepped upon a softball "a duty to use
reasonable care to avoid an accident." This statement may be dictum inasmuch
as the guest was contributorily negligent. But see Roth v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 266 App. Div. 872, 42 N.Y.S.2d 592 (2d Dep't 1943), and Faber v. Meiler,
278 App. Div. 849, 104 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1951), in which the guest was
treated as a licensee.
17. Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Crm. No. 9305 (1953).
18. See Comment, 1955 CAmB. L.J. 1, 8.
19. Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 938 (1949).
20. The confusion concomitant with inaugurating this rule led a commen-
tator on the recommendation to Parliament to favor keeping the present sys-
tem. 1955 CAmB. L.J. 1, 10.
1. "When any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children,
or the issue of any deceased child, unless it appears that such omission was
intentional, such child, or the issue of such child, must have the same share




termitted heir. Halfmoon v. Moore, 291 P.2d 846 (Idaho 1955).
In all but two states,2 pretermitted heir statutes have been enacted to
prevent an inadvertent disinheritance.3 Since this is their purpose,
any mention of a child by name in the will avoids their application.
4
In a majority of states the statutes apply only to children born after
execution of the will. In twenty states, however, the statutory protec-
tion extends to children and issue of deceased children living at the
time the will is executed.5 These statutes are of two broad types be-
tween which the essential difference is the manner of determining the
intent of the testator. Under the Massachusetts type statute6 the
intent of the testator may generally be proven by extrinsic evidence
7
while under the Missouri type statute8 the child must be mentioned in
the will or he will take an intestate share.9
In the instant case the gift to the child in the will failed because
of the subsequent act of the testatrix. Though this problem has infre-
quently arisen, in every case in which it has been presented the courts
have held the pretermitted heir statute inapplicable.1 0 The opinions of
these courts are to the effect that the statute applies only at the time
of the execution of the will and if the child is mentioned therein a
careless omission could not have occurred. No extraneous act of the
testator could erase the name of the child from the will." Notwith-
2. Maryland, Wyoming.
3. Their purpose is not to restrict the power of the testator or to require him
to provide for his children. Culp v. Culp, 206 Ark. 875, 178 S.W.2d 52 (1944);
Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); ATKIsoN, WnMLS 139 (1953);
Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 748
(1929).
4. Walker v. Case, 211 Ark. 1091, 204 S.W.2d 543 (1947); Kinnear v. Langley,
209 Ark. 878, 192 S.W.2d 978 (1946); Culp v. Culp, 206 Ark. 875, 178 S.W.2d 52
(1944); In re Benolkin's Estate, 122 Mont. 425, 205 P.2d 1141 (1949); Boucher
v. Lizotte, 85 N.H. 514, 161 Atl. 213 (1932).
5. See 29 CoLum. L. REv. 748 (1929) for an excellent analysis of the various
statutes.
6. "If a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, whether
born before or after the testator's death, or the issue of a deceased child...
they shall take the same share of his estate which they would have taken if
he had died intestate ... unless it appears that the omission was intentional
and not occasioned by accident or mistake." MAss. AnN. LAws c. 191, § 20
(1955).
7. Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Me. 297, 14 Atl. 197 (1888); Goff v. Britton
182 Mass. 293, 65 N.E. 379 (1902); Wilson v. Fosket, 47 Mass. (6 Met.) 406
(1843); Hannah v. Hannah, 70 R.I. 175, 37 A.2d 783 (1944); Goulet v. Miller,
144 Atl. 156 (R.I. 1929). See Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26 (1935).
8. "If any person make his last will, and die leaving a child or children, in
case of their death, not named or provided for such will . . . such child or
children, or their descendants, shall be entitled to such proportion of the
estate of the testator, real and personal, as if he had died intestate ...
Mo. REv. STAT. § 468.290 (1949).
9. Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); McCoy v. Bradbury,
290 Mo. 650, 235 S.W. 1047 (1921); Bower v. Bower, 5 Wash. 225, 31 Pac. 598
(1892). See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 1321 (1947).
10. Kinnear v. Langley, 209 Ark. 878, 192 S.W.2d 978 (1946) ; In re Callaghan's
Estate, 119 Cal. 571, 51 Pac. 860 (1898); Faucher v. Bouchard, 47 R.I. 150,
131 Atl. 556 (1926).
11. See especially Kinnear v. Langley, supra note 10, at 983.
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standing such authority, the court in the instant case allowed the child
to take an intestate share. The rationale is a syllogism which can be
stated in three steps. First, according to its previous holding in In re
Fe's Estate, 2 ,as interpreted by the court, any failure to provide for a
child in a will is presumed to be unintentional and this presumption
can only be rebutted by words in the will itself. Second, a sale of
property previously devised in a will, not only revokes that portion of
the will but also completely obliterates any mention of the devisee.13
Third, a child is not mentioned in the will if his only gift was defeated
by the testator's act, and the presumption of inadvertent omission
prevails.
The reasoning of the court seems fallacious when compared with the
supposed theory underlying pretermitted heir statutes. Certainly the
name of the child was physically present in the will when the will was
offered for probate as proof that at the time of its execution the
testator had his child in mind. The name was not literally obliterated.
Regardless of the reasoning used, implicit in the opinion is an extension
of the protection of the statute to cover a careless ademption.
12. 70 Idaho 399, 219 P.2d 941 (1950).
13. Most modem cases seem to hold that a conveyance of previously devised
property is not a revocation by alienation, but an ademption. See ATKMISON,
WILLs 433 (1953). However, as the court in the instant case construed their'
statute, an alienation of previously devised property revokes that portion of
the will. 291 P.2d at 848.
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